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Overrides: The Super-Study
Victoria F. Nourse*
Statutory interpretation has gone empirical in a big, big way. Earlier
this year, the second in the mammoth Gluck–Bressman studies on statutory
drafting was published by the Stanford Law Review. 1 Now we have the
equally mammoth Eskridge–Christiansen overrides study in the Texas Law
Review.2 Whether or not one agrees with these studies’ findings, the very
idea of supplementing the standard statutory interpretation debates with
something more than “big theory” is a delightful move in a pragmatic
direction. Rather than debating “law as integrity”3 or even “textualism,”4
these authors have jumped in the trenches, labored mightily, and tried to
unearth the facts of the matter. As Jerry Mashaw once wrote, without a
positive theory of lawmaking institutions, all our normative claims may be
fairy tales.5 One might as well throw all manner of brilliant theories in the
trash, if their factual assumptions are wrong.

* Victoria F. Nourse, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center and Director of
the Center of Congressional Studies at Georgetown Law.
1. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV.
725 (2014) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman, Part II]. For the first part of the study, see Abbe R.
Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of
Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013)
[hereinafter Gluck & Bressman, Part I].
2. Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEXAS L. REV. 1317, 1325 (2014).
3.RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 185 (Fontana Press 1986).
4. John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1288 (2010).
5. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING AMERICAN
SOCIAL INSURANCE 152 (1999).
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In 2012, the New York Times reported that congressional overrides of
judicial decisions had withered to almost nothing in the midst of hyperpartisan crisis. 6 This claim was based on a study by law professor and
political scientist Richard Hasen.7 Professor Eskridge, who had written an
earlier study showing far more override activity,8 questioned the findings.
With Christiansen, he embarked on the most ambitious study of overrides
ever undertaken. Not only is this study far more comprehensive than any of
the others—spanning 275 decisions and 44 years—it uses significantly
improved methodology (see below). 9 Because of this methodological
advance, it should now be considered the definitive study, the best effort so
far to obtain a universe (rather than a sample) of congressional overrides of
Supreme Court decisions.
What does the study tell us? There are a number of significant findings,
but the following stand out. First, overrides of Supreme Court decisions are
not the rare birds one might imagine and some positive theory has
predicted;10 they are, however, declining in numbers.11 The 1990s was the
golden age of overrides, in part because of two super-overrides, the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, which struck down multiple Supreme Court decisions. Second,
overrides are bipartisan, occurring during periods of divided government and
high partisanship. The super-overrides are a good example: the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 moved in the liberal direction,12 the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 in the conservative direction.13 Third, Congress

6. Adam Liptak, In Congress’s Paralysis, a Mightier Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/21/us/politics/supreme-court-gains-power-from-paralysisof-congress.html?_r=0 (quoting Professor Richard L. Hasen).
7. Id.
8. William N. Eskridge Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101
YALE L.J. 331 (1991).
9. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1329.
10. See id. at 1458 (stating that the 1990s was the “golden age” for overrides). For example,
some positive theory suggests that there should be no overrides because, as a strategic actor, the
Court will manipulate its doctrine to avoid override. Pablo T. Spiller & Emerson H. Tiller,
Invitations to Override: Congressional Reversals of Supreme Court Decisions, 16 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 503, 505 (1996).
11. There is some dispute about why we have seen this decline; Hasen has argued hyperpartisanship, Eskridge and Christensen posit a shift in subject matter area—Congress is focused on
matters that are not the bread and butter of judicial interpretation. Eskridge & Christiansen, supra
note 2, at 1347–53. Another interpretation for which I have only anecdotal evidence is simply that,
after 2000, members were elected to the Senate to “destroy the institution” (the words of a staffer in
my 2000 study of judiciary committee staffers). See Victoria Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The
Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 605–10
(2002). There is a difference between large policy differences on a party scale and members who
use individual prerogatives to block any action.
12. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1319–20 (providing “examples of broad
bipartisan laws that ambitiously reset statutory policies, and in the process, override bushels of
Supreme Court opinions”).
13. Id.
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does not override because of statutory method (e.g. textualism or
purposivism). The only exception to that rule is the finding that decisions
based on the “whole code” doctrine—which presumes Congress uses words
consistently throughout the United States Code—are statistically more likely
to be overridden.14
Overrides should be of interest to a far larger group of scholars than
statutory interpretation enthusiasts. We have, in overrides, open interbranch
encounters between Congress and the Courts far more typically found in the
shadows of everyday Washington politics. Interestingly, Christiansen and
Eskridge posit the court-congress relationship as more triadic than dyadic
given the role played by agencies. One of their more interesting conclusions
is that agencie are the big winners in the override game: agencies were
present in seventy percent of the override cases and the agency view
prevailed with Congress and against the Supreme Court in three-quarters of
those overrides.15 When the Supreme Court rejects the statutory
interpretations of agencies, supported by the Solicitor General, it does so at
its peril. This suggests that the common wisdom—that agencies often have
a better handle than courts on Congress’s meaning because of their closer
connections with Congress (through oversight, expertise about the statute,
informal communications, etc.)—is true. It also suggests that broad
congressional delegation to agencies—traditionally viewed with suspicion by
lawyers—may come with a silver interpretive lining.
In this response, I make no attempt to survey the richness of this
gargantuan study nor the extraordinary effort it must have taken. It should
be of interest to readers of court–congress interaction, students of agency
action, scholars of statutory interpretation, and the separation of powers.
My aim is not to repeat the study, or even to summarize it, but to provide a
parsimonious and helpful lens through which we may understand its
intellectual assumptions and accomplishments. In Part I, I address its
methodological virtues and vices. In Part II, I posit a fairly parsimonious
model that helps to explain the rich Christiansen and Eskridge findings. In
Part III, I provide a brief comment on the authors’ recommendations for
future action.
I.

The Method: Virtues and Vices

Every empirical study comes with implicit intellectual assumptions.
This is nowhere more true than in the empirical methods used to collect data.
Christiansen and Eskridge have done something very important on the
methodological side that may go unnoticed by the average reader: it may
sound basic, but counting overrides is actually very difficult and needs to be

14. See id. at 1405–08 (finding that “[w]here the Court relies significantly on the statutory
scheme, or various whole act or whole code canons, it is much more likely to be overridden”).
15. Id. at 1321.
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responsive to how Congress actually legislates. 16 At the same time, the
Christiansen and Eskridge findings, like most other studies in this area, are
necessarily limited by their focus—Supreme Court decisions. This raises
some questions about whether their findings reflect the larger field of all
federal statutory interpretation decisions, even if they provide some
cautionary lessons for federal courts.
A. Virtues: Understanding the Basics About Congress
Today, law schools teach a kind of civic illiteracy; they are full of
courses on the minutiae of civil and administrative procedure, but none on
the very basic congressional procedures by which law is made. The
common law, all but dead to members of the Supreme Court, is nevertheless
alive and well in law schools. By contrast, the vast lawmaking institutions
of our democracy—Congress and the Executive Branch—are studied through
the “rear view” mirror, through cases rather than from the “inside.”
Empiricism, for all of its potential problems, is a necessary step forward in
the battle to remedy this radical gap in law school education. One cannot
study Congress, or its actions (such as overrides), without some basic
understanding of how Congress operates.
Prior studies in this area, including Eskridge’s own (as he admits), 17
were based on rudimentary, and faulty, assumptions about Congress.
Following the ancient, now outmoded Wilsonian wisdom that all things in
Congress happen in committee,18 prior studies (even ones done by political
scientists) were based on identifying overrides by looking at committee
reports. This will systematically undercount overrides since, in the past 30
years, bills increasingly bypass committee. What Barbara Sinclair once
called “unorthodox lawmaking,” has become “orthodox.”19 As Gluck and
Bressman show in their study of the recent Congress many bills simply
bypass committee today.20 Rectifying that here, Christiansen and Eskridge
realize that if they are to “find” statutory overrides, they cannot rely, as did
the original study, on committee reports to provide them with such
information. Instead, they engage in a heroic effort to wade through
debates, hearings, and a variety of other congressional sources to locate

16. Id. at 1331.
17. Id. at 1326–28; cf. Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, The
Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. CALIF. L. REV. 205, 214–24 (2013) (using the committee
report methodology).
18. THOMAS WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 79 (1885) (“Congress in session is Congress on public exhibition, whilst Congress in its
committee-rooms is Congress at work.”).
19. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 1, at 918, 936, 979, 1022 (explaining “how the
‘textbook’ legislative process no longer exists”).
20. Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note 1, at 756–57 (describing how leadership
involvement in statutory drafting allows legislators to remove statutes from the committee process).
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overrides. To the extent earlier studies have not used this methodology, they
have been superseded by Christiansen and Eskridge.
B. Vices: All Interpretive Overrides?
Having hurdled one rather important methodological barrier does not
mean, however, that the study solves all methodological problems. What
can we really know, many will say, from a study focusing on that oh-soatypical body, the Supreme Court? Christiansen and Eskridge’s universe
does not include Congress’s track record of overriding lower court decisions.
Such overrides do happen. There are celebrated anecdotal examples of
appellate cases that the Congress has chosen to override as fast as you can
call the roll: notice how quickly Congress overrode a decision from a federal
court of appeals branding plea bargaining a bribe!21 Thus, we do not know
from this study the proportion of all statutory interpretation cases, decided
by the Supreme Court and the federal courts, which are overridden. If we
expand the denominator, increasing the number of cases from the fraction
heard by the Supreme Court to all federal cases, the incidence of overrides is
likely to drop dramatically.
Christiansen and Eskridge might respond as follows: we recognize that
we have studied the universe of Supreme Court cases, but our findings are
generalizable as a sample of all federal court decisions. The problem here is
that Supreme Court decisions are unlikely to be a representative sample; they
differ from standard appellate decisions along a number of dimensions.
First, Supreme Court decisions are skewed toward the politically imperative
because the Court chooses its decisions; appellate courts do not have the
certiorari discretion accorded to the Supreme Court. Second, Supreme
Court decisions are also visible to the public—and voters—in a way that
appellate decisions generally are not. How is Congress to override a
decision that it does not know about? There are significant barriers to
communication between courts and Congress, as Judge Katzmann has
explained.22 These factors will systematically skew the number of Supreme
Court overrides relative to lower court overrides. Bottom line: one
generalizes from the Supreme Court to lower court behavior, and
Congressional response to that behavior, at one’s peril.
This scope question provides an important caution about how judges and
lawyers should read the Christiansen and Eskridge study. In my first year
classes, it is often queried by students, “well, can’t Congress just change the
law if the court makes a bad statutory interpretation decision?” So, too,
judges are increasingly, according to Eskridge and Christenson, signaling to
Congress that it should override its statutory decisions if they are wrong.

21. United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1343 (10th Cir. 1998), vacated, 165 F.3d 1297
(10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
22. Robert A. Katzmann, Madison Lecture: Statutes, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 637, 666 (2012).
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Lawyers and judges should not confuse findings of overrides, or even a
judicial call for an override, with the notion that Congress will in fact
respond. Any view that assumes it is easy to pass a statute is wildly
uninformed about the difficulty of legislation. It is a bit like comparing
running up a hill with running up the Alps, or perhaps in a case of a superoverride, running up Everest. Almost by definition (the numbers) one can
predict that the average man-hours spent getting the agreement of 535
members, representing a country of 300 million, far exceeds the effort for
any Supreme Court decision that has ever been written (9 Justices plus 36
clerks versus 535 members and 30,000 staff). The courts are a tiny
institution compared to Congress, and no one should forget that basic fact,
else one commit the kind of legally solipsistic error of thinking that the earth
(i.e. the judiciary) is the center of the universe.
Let us not diminish, however, what the Christiansen and Eskridge study
does say to judges and courts. After all, one of the most important roles of
the Supreme Court is to provide guidance to lower courts. Judges and
lawyers should now be on notice—for the second time23—that some outlier
interpretive methods are likely to yield results contrary to Congress’s aims.
As they explain it, decisions are more likely to be overridden when they are
based on “reliance on plain meaning of statutory text, especially when such
reliance depends critically on whole act and whole code arguments or flies in
the face of strong legislative history.”24 To those of us who study Congress,
there is little surprise in this conclusion; after all, empirical studies on
Congress tend to suggest that the “whole code” rule is wildly unrealistic25
and that Congress cannot act without the use of what lawyers call “legislative
history”—ergo that Congress uses reports and debate to coordinate meaning.
Lower courts, as well as the Supreme Court, should now know that, if their
aim is to avoid override, it is wise to confirm their “plain” meanings by
reference to actual congressional context—as opposed to hypothesized
“whole code” rule or mere assertions that text is “plain.”
II. Congressional Overrides from the Inside
Every empirical study makes intellectual commitments and this one is no
different. Overrides require at least two institutions and focusing on the
Supreme Court causes one to ask questions one might not ask, as we will see,
if one focused on Congress from the inside. Christiansen and Eskridge use
what I would call a legal methodology, one which aims to discover why
Congress overruled the Supreme Court through the common law method—
for example, looking at the subject matters and interpretive methods used in
particular Supreme Court opinions.
In compiling this information,
23. See Eskridge, supra note 7, at 335–36.
24. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1321.
25. See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, at 933–39; Gluck & Bressman, Part II, at 760–761; Nourse
& Schacter, supra note 10.

2014]

Response

211

Christensen and Eskridge have expended extraordinary effort, providing
lengthy and detailed accounts of particular subject matter areas and
individual overrides and compiling legislative histories of enormous
complexity. The effort is almost mind-boggling when one imagines the
review not only of the Supreme Court’s cases, the overriding bills, and the
debates of about 286 bills.26 Consistent with this approach, Christiansen and
Eskridge argue that there are some subject matter areas far more likely to
yield overrides than others. From this, they offer a long list of normative
conclusions about court–congress–administration dialogue.
This normative approach leaves one wondering about a very basic
question: why Congress ever overrides, given the press of business in
Congress and seemingly ever-present hyperpartisanship. Positive political
theory suggests that overrides should be rare, if not nonexistent (as a strategic
player, the Supreme Court will insulate its decisions from override). That
invites us to ask: What are Congress’s incentives for overriding? And, if we
consider those factors, is it possible to obtain a more parsimonious predictive
tool? Loosely borrowing from a very famous diagram offered by the
political scientist James Q. Wilson to describe the likelihood of different
kinds of legislation, 27 I offer a diagrammatic hypothesis about overrides.
The diagram below suggests that, from the congressional perspective, there
are two major influences: first, whether the decision or the override passes
the agenda threshold—meaning that Congress is paying attention; 28 the
second is whether the decision to override can be resolved in a bipartisan
manner.29
No Override
AGENDA threshold
BIPARTISAN
threshold

No Override

YES

NO

NO

YES

I posit that if the issue does not pass the agenda threshold then there is no
significant likelihood of an override. Issues for which there is no call for
change—whether from a mass public or an interest group—will not motivate
26. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1330 (describing the methodology employed
by Christiansen & Eskridge).
27. JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS (1973).
28. DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 36–62 (2004); see also
Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian
Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1153–62 (2011).
29. I don’t mean that the parties have to agree at a general level, but that at the particular level
of the override they have to obtain at least 60 votes to surmount the filibuster barrier in the Senate,
which typically involves moving some votes across party lines. See KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL
POLITICS: A THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING (1998).

212

Texas Law Review See Also

[Vol. 92:205

legislative action. Issues must cross a salience or agenda threshold, given
that there is limited time for legislative action. As Christiansen and
Eskridge’s examples suggest, there may be many statutory interpretation
decisions in need of override (in theory, those decisions could vastly
outnumber the actual overrides by hundreds or even thousands of statutes),
but if the judicial decisions do not catch anyone’s attention in Congress, and
are not put on the agenda, there will be no override—even if there would be
bipartisan support had it risen to the agenda. An override can hurdle the
agenda threshold in many ways, by individual action, interest group pressure,
major public outcry, or crisis, but it has to hurdle that barrier to be
considered.
Even if the potential override passes the agenda threshold, overrides
must also cross a bipartisanship threshold. Once the issue is on the agenda,
the greater the bipartisan support for override, the greater the chance for
actual override legislation. Bipartisanship of some degree is necessary to
hurdle the filibuster barrier in the Senate (60 votes) and may be necessary to
bridge party differences between the House and the Senate. By contrast, if
the Congress is hopelessly divided even on a high agenda issue (gun control
or the death penalty) there is far less likelihood of override unless the
bipartisanship threshold can be hurdled. Based on this metric, I hypothesize
the following: that high agenda and high bipartisanship are most likely to
yield an override. By contrast, low agenda (no one cares) and low
bipartisanship (high internal conflict) are likely not to produce an override.
This model helps to explain a number of the Christiansen and Eskridge
findings. First, it explains their principal finding about the types of
overrides. Christiansen and Eskridge conclude that “overrides are usually
not the contentious process that characterized the 1991 [Civil Rights Act] and
other dramatic overrides of great interest to the media, law students, and
many academics.”30 Two-thirds of the overrides were what Christiansen and
Eskridge characterize as “policy updating,” where there is not a “great deal
of negative judgment about the Court’s performance,” but the Congress
considers its policy judgment, rather than the Supreme Court’s, more
efficient or wise or popular.31 Another significant portion of overrides were
“clarifying overrides,” even less important in policy terms, but “responding
to confusion in the law” or “fine-tuning statutes in ways that have few policy
consequences.”32
If this is correct, it supports the view that the vast majority of overrides
are, just as Christiansen and Eskridge find, capable of bipartisan resolution
without tremendous effort—they are not “dramatic,” there is no newsworthy
court–congress battle. Only 20 percent of the overrides in their sample dealt

30. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1369.
31. Id. at 1370.
32. Id. at 1373.
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with the kind of issues they dubbed contentious or dramatic.33 To spin this
out a bit, consider the outlier case, where there is drama and the issue easily
passes the agenda hurdle but is highly contentious and definitely not
bipartisan. Christiansen and Eskridge acknowledge that the Civil Rights Act
(CRA) of 1991 is the prime example of a major court–congress battle about
“restoring” the law to its prior position before Supreme Court
interpretation.34 Anyone who knows even a smidgen about the legislative
battle over the CRA of 1991 knows that it was contentious, took years to
accomplish, and was the subject of major party battles. It was only passed
in the end by overriding the President, which means, by definition, that there
is supermajoritarian support for the override.35
By contrast, the vast majority of overrides (the 80% defined by
Christiansen and Eskridge as “policy-updating” and “clarifying”) 36 are
precisely the kind of nondramatic, nonpublicly divisive issues susceptible to
bipartisan compromise. Consider the second area Christiansen and Eskridge
find yielding a significant number of overrides: federal jurisdiction and civil
procedure. Like tax and bankruptcy, the third and fourth areas with a
significant number of overrides respectively, one might think these subjects
would not even hurdle the agenda barrier—the arcana of tax, jurisdiction, and
bankruptcy are hardly dinner table conversation or the subject of voting
placards (I “voted for him because of his position on civil procedure?!”).
However, interest groups can propel an issue onto the agenda. And, indeed,
in the jurisdiction case, as Christiansen and Eskridge explain, it was the
plaintiffs’ bar in one case and the business bar in another, that made an
“issue” of these jurisdictional questions.37 Once over the agenda hurdle, the
question was whether one could find a bipartisan solution. As Christiansen
and Eskridge explain, in the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, the
plaintiffs’ bar managed to find support from President George H.W. Bush;38
with the bipartisanship hurdle overcome, the override was accomplished.
Put in other words, the kinds of issues this study found yielding overrides
were not do or die political issues, but instead issues capable of bipartisan
compromise once on the agenda.
This metric also helps to explain the “winners” Christiansen and
Eskridge find in this process. They conclude that the federal government

33. Id. at 1369–75.
34. Id. at 1374.
35. See Roger Clegg, Introduction: A Brief Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
54 LA. L. REV. 1459, 1464–1469 (1994) (relating the process by which the 1991 Civil Rights Act
was eventually signed into law, including an original veto and many subsequent re-negotiations);
Donald R. Livingston, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and EEOC Enforcement, 23 STETSON L. REV.
53, 53 (1993) (characterizing the Civil Rights Act that President Bush signed into law as “hotly
debated”).
36. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1370–74.
37. Id. at 1382.
38. Id.
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and, to a lesser extent, state and local governments are “big” winners in the
override process.39 Again this should not be surprising from the perspective
of the agenda–bipartisanship model. Winners like the federal and state
governments have significant clout to get items on the congressional
agenda. 40 Members of the federal government deal with members of
Congress on a regular basis through letters, at cocktail parties, and more
importantly at oversight hearings. The Attorney General can easily send up
a list of his favorite Supreme Court override candidates. Members of the
Senate and the House also typically have ties to local government officials—
both “ties of representation” (they are representing the same voters) and “ties
of party” (they may have party affiliations). Because of these ties, state and
local politicians are also capable of hurdling the agenda threshold. Finally,
in one of the most striking findings, Christiansen and Eskridge conclude that
agencies are the biggest winners.41 It should be no surprise that agencies
can have, and have had, a strong interest in getting an issue on the
congressional agenda, particularly when their views have effectively been
“dissed” in the Supreme Court.
Finally, this metric explains the converse phenomenon: no override. For
example, it explains why Congress does not override particular methods of
statutory interpretation. No one ever lost an election by saying “I’m for
purposivism.” Methods of statutory interpretation are the arcana of a
lawyerly elite and are unlikely to hurdle the agenda bar. Although law
professors repeatedly call on Congress to do something about interpretive
regimes, the only way this will happen is if “interpretation” hurdles the
agenda threshold, and there is no reason in votes or interest groups to suggest
that is the case outside a particular controversy of public import. That some
state legislatures have enacted interpretive rules does not suggest to the
contrary—no single state is the leader of the free world, with lots of other
things to do than to adopt a “plain meaning” rule the courts have already
adopted. Less obviously, it also explains why statutes sorely in need of
override, that affect millions of people, never yield a congressional response.
Christiansen and Eskridge decry the failure to override decisions interpreting
ERISA, a law affecting a pension network covering millions of citizens.42
On both the agenda and bipartisanship scores, however, ERISA overrides are
not likely. Dispersed majorities often suffer without interest groups to bring
their issues onto the agenda, and here, as Christiansen and Eskridge

39. Id. at 1376.
40. See George Tsebelis & Bjørn Erik Rasch, Government and Legislative Agenda Setting: An
Introduction, in THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTS IN LEGISLATIVE AGENDA SETTING 2, 5 (George
Tsebelis & Bjørn Erik Rasch eds., 2011) (explaining legislative agenda setting as a function of
“institutional” power, which are constitutional entitlements or procedural rules that allow
governments to control what issues make it on the agenda, and describing the legislative process as
a “scarce resource” that the government can control through its own agenda-setting).
41. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1377–79.
42. Id. at 1366–67.
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themselves note, the relevant interest groups (unions and business) are locked
in a combat unlikely to reach bipartisan solution.
To conclude, consider an example showing how an override can move
from the unlikely category to the super-override category along the lines I
have described. Christiansen and Eskridge classify the habeas reform of
1995 as a “super-override.”43 On the other hand, they argue that most of the
law was in fact “policy-updating.” Given that I was involved with this
statute while working as a congressional staffer, I can report the following: In
fact, there was substantial contention (and debate) about habeas in large part
because Supreme Court Justices put habeas on the legislative agenda;44 but it
went nowhere. From 1991–1993, the Senate debated, and redebated,
habeas, including items such as whether to overrule the Teague v. Lane
habeas retroactivity rule (arcane to most lawyers, but highly important to
death penalty litigators). 45 Nothing happened, despite year after year of
debate (the issue was first broached in bills introduced in the Reagan
administration in the 1980s), because there was no bipartisan solution.46
With so much contention, why did habeas reform ultimately yield a
super-override? It hurdled the bipartisanship barrier. Major public events
can push an item over the agenda threshold to “must pass” category. By
“must pass” I mean a bill that has an effect upon members’ electoral future.
In the habeas case, it took the Oklahoma City Bombing to yield a superoverride statute. 47 Why? Because of the implications of habeas for
terrorists subject to the death penalty. These implications had electoral
consequences. The question to the public would be whether the legislator
coddled terrorists. Once the electorate was perceived as imposing bipartisan
costs at the next election,, the legislators cobbled together an override bill
that few lawyers might have recommended—by pasting republican and
democratic bills together, yielding what many statutory interpreters term a
mess, but a mess capable of hurdling the bipartisanship barrier.48
If I am correct, then a rather parsimonious matrix can, in theory at least
(it is subject to empirical verification), increase the likelihood of an override,

43. Id. at 1371–72.
44. Violent Crime Control Act of 1991: Hearing on S. 618 and S. 635 Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 14 (1991) (statement of Hon. Richard L. Thornburgh, Att’y Gen. of the
United States).
45. See, e.g. 137 CONG. REC. S18,235 (July 15, 1991) (statement of Sen. Spector) (discussing
habeas corpus reform).
46. See Charles Doyle, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: A Summary
(June 3, 1996), http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/96-499.htm (stating that the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 is the product of legislative efforts stretching back well over a decade).
47. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 96-499A, ANTITERRORISM AND
EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996: A SUMMARY (1996), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/96-499.htm (stating that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 was passed in response to the Oklahoma City bombing)
48. Larry Yackle describes this in a lengthy article. Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New
Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381 (1996).
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the likelihood of no override, and the likelihood that a bill will move from
one category to another. I hope that, in future work, students of overrides
will take the extraordinary cornucopia of information provided in the
Christiansen and Eskridge super-override study to test this hypothesis.
III. Normative Implications
Christiansen and Eskridge conclude their study with a variety of
normative recommendations largely sympathetic to overrides.49 They, like
others before them, find a court–congress dialogue something to be
encouraged.50 They argue that overrides serve a number of values, including
the rule of law and democratic transparency.51 The last fourth of the article
is a lengthy exegesis of the virtues of overrides as a part of our system of
government.52 Of particular interest are their conclusions as they apply to
the “triadic” relationship to agencies, which turn out to be big winners here.
I leave it to the readers to determine whether in fact they agree with these
normative claims about the virtues of overrides. I would simply caution
scholars to remember the transaction costs of the override enterprise and the
relative size of the institutions. We are talking about the Supreme Court,
with 9 Justices, 36 clerks, and maybe a few hundred employees, against 535
members and 30,000 staffers, representing 300 million people. Whose time
do we want to waste on matters that Christiansen and Eskridge acknowledge
are not the major political issues of our time? Overrides can be enormously
costly, requiring decades of efforts to achieve the agreement of 535 members
and the President. This is time taken away from war, poverty, budgets
monetary policy, and climate change in the greatest free nation on earth.
Christiansen and Eskridge are correct, in my view, to begin to imagine a
way in which the vast bulk of the quotidian overrides (and they themselves
suggest the vast majority of overrides are quotidian from a political
perspective) can be accomplished more easily. They propose a variety of
institutional solutions. My response is this: any real solution will require
an institution that can put the issue on the agenda, and force a bipartisan
solution. It is not a matter for technocrats inside any department (e.g. the
Justice Department) or within the Congress (e.g. professional legislation
drafters). The only way out of override politics is through it, which will
require an institution with significant stature and political background to
respond to Congress’s institutional realities—to force an issue on the
override agenda, and cobble together a bipartisan group to pass the override.

49.
50.
51.
52.

Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1439–79.
Id. at 1439–40.
Id. at 1464–65.
Id. at 1439–79

